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Post-conventional Political Cultures via Processes of
Direct Democracy: Theoretical Considerations Based on
J€urgen Habermas and Lawrence Kohlberg
ROLF RAUSCHENBACH
Abstract: In this article, it is proposed to differentiate political cultures in two dimensions. First,
inspired by Habermas’ distinction of the contents of discourse, a distinction is suggested between
moral, ethical-political and pragmatic elements of political culture as well as of an element of culture
of balancing interests. Second, inspired by Kohlberg’s stage models for the development of the indi-
vidual moral consciousness and for moral culture, a distinction is similarly suggested between two
pre-conventional, two conventional and two post-conventional collective stages of political culture. It
can be shown that from a normative point of view, only deliberations made in a post-conventional
political culture can produce reasonable or at least fair results. Conceptual considerations indicate
processes of direct democracy as the method for promoting post-conventional political cultures. The
more liberty that the citizens have to formulate and trigger processes of direct democracy, the more
one can expect from them to generate post-conventional political cultures.
KEYWORDS: Deliberative democracy, Moral culture, Political culture, Direct democracy, Developmental
psychology
Introduction1
It was Montesquieu who argued as one of the ﬁrst authors that cultural elements are relevant for
the stability of a political system. He stated that fear stabilizes despotism, honor is the cultural
basis of monarchy and virtue the foundation of a republic (2008 [1748]). John Stuart Mill added
to this the idea that individuals are able to learn and, consequently, that the cultural basis of a
polity can be modiﬁed over time (1865 [1861]). The modern concept of political culture goes
back to the work of Almond and Verba, who were looking for an explication for the stability (or
lack thereof) of political systems. Their basic point was that a polity remains stable only when
its institutions are congruent with the prevalent political culture. They formulated four types of
political culture and stated that only a civic culture could guarantee the long-term survival of a
democracy. In general terms, for these two authors, political culture provides the psychological
basis for democracy. It represents the socially internalized cognitive, affective and evaluative
orientations of an individual towards others, in particular in political contexts (1989 [1963]: 14).
Other authors have reﬁned and varied the concept. Easton (1965a, 1965b, 1990) proposes a
matrix which combines two forms of political support (diffuse and speciﬁc) with three objects of
1 This paper is based on my doctoral thesis, which has been elaborated under the guidance of Philippe Mastronardi and
Peter Gross at Universität St. Gallen. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on this
paper.
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the political system (political community, political regime and political authority). Lipset derives
stability of a political system from its legitimacy and efﬁciency (1960). Fuchs proposes a com-
plex model of political processes based on political support; political culture plays a central role
(2002). As Lipset, Diamond also studies the relationship between legitimacy and efﬁciency,
however in a more sophisticated manner; in addition to that, he attempts to establish bench-
marks, which should allow determining the stability of political systems (1999). Rohe focuses
on the procedural character of political culture and underlines its symbolic importance (1994). In
addition to the traditional notion of political culture, two concepts have been introduced which
can be seen as extensions of the initial idea: Inglehart studies values and their modiﬁcations
(1977; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In his conception, political culture is rather dependent on the
general set of values of a society. His overall goal is to explain the shift from materialistic to
post-materialistic values. Here, he identiﬁes civic values as important drivers for this develop-
ment. Putnam coined the resource of a collective to coordinate itself efﬁciently social capital
(1993; 2000; 2002). It is interesting to note that none of these authors refers to Habermas,
despite the fact that their considerations have a strong normative grounding; Habermas touches
only superﬁcially on Almond and Verba as well as on Inglehart.
In political crises of established democracies as well as when polities cannot be democratized
as desired, the lack of adequate political culture is often advocated as the prime reason for such
problematic situations. Przeworski et al. (1998) showed however, that the stability of democra-
cies is ﬁrst and foremost determined by the income per capita. Above a certain threshold, they
were not able to identify one single case where a democracy crumbled. From this, they conclude
that it would be rather difﬁcult to prove that political culture has causal quality on the stability
of democracies.
In this paper, political culture is not conceptualized as a strictly causal variable. The view
adopted here is hermeneutical: it is assumed that political culture is both consequence as well as
cause of political behavior. Formal political institutions and socio-economic circumstances play
an equally important role in this game. It is assumed, though in this paper I will not test it
empirically, that changes in the political culture can be viewed as early signs of more profound
political alterations, which ultimately can result in formal institutional modiﬁcations. However,
this assumption also works the other way around: a speciﬁc set of political institutions has an
impact on the political culture of that very polity; this point will be illustrated with the institu-
tions of direct democracy. When I refer to political culture, I mean the sum of the collectively
held but not formally institutionalized norms and beliefs which steer political actors in their pub-
lic views and actions. It goes without saying that theses norms and beliefs are not independent
variables, they are also inﬂuenced by the formal political institutions and the socio-economic cir-
cumstances. However, I hold up the normative hypothesis that humans as rational beings have a
certain capability to decide on their own, independently of the political institutions and socio-
economic circumstances they live in, what is morally right or wrong, what kind of identity they
would like to pursue, how the factual world should be dealt with and how consensus or compro-
mise with others can be reached. The goal of this paper is to show how an individual acquires
such cognitive capabilities and how, from an institutional point of view, these learning processes
can be promoted.
The issues raised in this paper will be dealt with in a theoretical manner. As a starting point,
the theory of deliberative democracy by J€urgen Habermas has been chosen. The choice is moti-
vated by its explicit normative quality (derived from the ethics of discourse, 1983; 1991) and its
integration into the overarching theoretical framework of communicative action (1995), which
allows to situate the observations in a wider theoretical context. However, the analysis of Haber-
mas’ concept of political culture will lead to an unsatisfactory result: Although political culture
478 Rolf Rauschenbach
© 2012 Swiss Political Science Association Swiss Political Science Review (2012) Vol. 18(4): 477–497
plays an important role in his theory, he provides only a vague conceptualization and no hints of
how political cultures that favor deliberation could be promoted. To ﬁll these gaps, I go back to
the work of Lawrence Kohlberg who formulated an extensive theory on the acquisition of moral
reasoning capabilities; he also developed a system of collective stages of moral culture, which
will be the basis for my conceptualization of political culture. Habermas and Kohlberg worked
together quite intensively, in particular when the ﬁrst was formulating his ethics of discourse and
the second his philosophy and psychology of moral development. They inspired each other pro-
foundly; both declared the other’s work as important complements to their own theories. Their
dialog was abruptly ended by Kohlberg’s early death in 1987. The present study can be viewed
as an attempt to virtually continue the dialog between Habermas and Kohlberg.
Kohlberg’s ideas were received quite controversially; this can be exempliﬁed by two critiques
he was faced with: Carol Gilligan alleged that Kohlberg would systematically favor a male ethics
of justice as opposed to a female ethics of care (1982). It is a fact that Kohlberg-thinking relies
mainly on theories of justice, but this did not favor the assessment of male participants in inter-
views guided by Kohlberg (Jaffee and Hyde 2000: 721). Although Gilligan’s critique was empir-
ically unfounded, it enriched the debate on the development of moral reasoning insofar as it
showed that a focus on justice only might limit the understanding of the phenomenon. Kohl-
berg’s later shift of focus from the individual to the collective can be viewed as an indirect
response to Gilligan’s critique. In a similar vein goes the allegation that Kohlberg promoted a
western worldview and values incompatible with other cultures. Kohlberg and his team tested
the theory of individual stages of moral reasoning in more than ﬁfty intercultural research pro-
jects and were able to identify the ﬁrst four individual stages in almost all cultures; they could
identify the ﬁfth stage not only in western countries, but also in modern urban settings in India,
Japan and Taiwan (Kohlberg 1996: 28). Although the second allegation was empirically
unfounded too, it cannot be denied that intercultural research on moral reasoning is a challenging
task. The critique and the difﬁculties encountered motivated Kohlberg and his team to review
various elements of their thinking and testing and allowed them to reﬁne their approach.
Revisiting Kohlberg’s pedagogical methods to promote the individual cognitive capabilities in
moral reasoning and the moral culture of a collective will shed new light on processes of direct
democracy. It will become clear that these institutions favor the generation of post-conventional
political cultures by involving all citizens in the decision-making process.
The concept of political culture in the writing of Habermas
According to Habermas, democratic institutions alone are not sufﬁcient to allow for deliberations
that produce reasonable or at least fair results. In addition to institutions, a certain kind of politi-
cal culture is required which disposes political actors – citizens as well as ofﬁce holders – to
apply reason and by doing so, enable solidarity (1999: 206). He states that political culture is
the foundation for democratic freedom and at the same time the medium in which political pro-
gress towards more democracy takes place (1999: 333). Political culture allows citizens to react
upon legal, but illegitimate, situations according to their moral beliefs (1996: 87). Without politi-
cal culture, citizens become isolated, egoistic monads, exercising their individual rights as weap-
ons against each other (2005: 112). The political culture that favors deliberations is characterized
by a paradox: although it is a prerequisite, there is no way to force or steer its generation. The
state has to refrain from political indoctrination or more subtle normative demands, as this would
rather damage the political culture (1999: 381).
Although the concept of political culture plays an important role in the theory of deliberative
democracy, Habermas provides a rather vague deﬁnition of it and no clear hints on how political
Post-conventionality via Direct Democracy 479
© 2012 Swiss Political Science Association Swiss Political Science Review (2012) Vol. 18(4): 477–497
culture can be promoted. This paper aims to ﬁll this gap. Kohlberg’s concept of moral culture
and his pedagogical instruments of dilemma discussions and just community will inspire the
answers.
The concept of moral culture in the writing of Kohlberg
Kohlberg is most known for his research on the individual stages of moral reasoning. He argues
that moral behavior is the result of affective and cognitive processes; it is however the cognitive
reasoning that gives behavior a moral quality (1984: 9). Cognitive processes create the moral
consciousness, which enables a person to interact with others along explicit moral choices. In
that sense, moral reasoning is a cognitive capability, which allows a person to assume different
perspectives in a moral dilemma and to reﬂect on the conﬂicting views to derive a just solution.
However, this capability needs to be acquired. Kohlberg describes this learning process in two
pre-conventional, two conventional and two post-conventional stages.
In general, cognitive stages have the following characteristics (Colby and Kohlberg 1987:
6ff): while different cognitive stages serve the same basic function of reasoning, they imply a
qualitative difference in structures. This means that different modes of thinking can be observed
in different stages. Stages form an invariant sequence, meaning that an individual has to go
through one stage at a time; none can be skipped. A number of factors may speed up the pro-
gress along this sequence, slow it down or even stop it, but they do not change the sequence as
such. These sequential modes of thought form a structural whole. A given stage response to a
task does not simply represent a speciﬁc response determined by knowledge and familiarity with
that task or tasks similar to it; rather, it represents the organization of an underlying thought.
Stages are hierarchical integrations and form an order of increasingly differentiated and inte-
grated structures for fulﬁlling a common function. Therefore, higher stages integrate the struc-
tures at lower stages.
Based on the concept of individual stages, Kohlberg and his colleagues formulated six stages
of individual moral reasoning as well as detailed interview guidelines to assess the cognitive
capabilities of individual persons facing a moral dilemma. With extensive empirical research,
they were able to identify quite easily the ﬁrst four stages of pre-conventional and conventional
moral reasoning. The ﬁfth stage could be identiﬁed less easily, as post-conventional stages are
normally reached by adulthood and Kohlberg was predominantly testing children and teenagers.
The sixth stage serves mainly as a normative reference and may have been reached only by indi-
viduals such as Gandhi or Martin Luther King.
In his later research, Kohlberg shifted his focus from the individual to the collective. This was
due to his observation that in certain schools, students developed to higher stages more quickly
than in others, despite the fact that individually they seemed to have the same cognitive capabili-
ties. Kohlberg realized that the general setting of a school, both in terms of the physical infra-
structure as well as the “soft factors” had an inﬂuence on the development of the students. It
was in this context where he coined the concept of “moral culture”. His notion of culture is
based on Levine (1981): “Culture is a shared organization of ideas that includes the intellectual,
moral and aesthetic standards prevalent in a community and the meaning of communicative
action.” In that sense, moral culture refers to the shared ideas and norms of a group on how to
resolve moral dilemmas in a way that the group deems adequate.
To distinguish different kinds of moral cultures, Kohlberg extended his concept of individual
stages to collective ones. Here, the characteristics of individual stages, as described above, are
softened. Individual stages refer to the cognitive structures of individual persons; collective
stages refer to a group of persons and their behavior. While it is assumed that individuals think
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and constantly try to organize and integrate their cognitive structures in a rational way, no
“group mind” is assumed doing the same, even though it is maintained that individuals interact-
ing in groups construct common norms, which in turn inﬂuence their thinking in the group.
However, the construction of such common norms reﬂects moral reasoning performance, not
moral reasoning competence. For that reason, collective stages have a qualitatively different
structure (Power et al. 1989a: 136ff): The dynamics within collective stages do not follow an
invariant sequence. There is no natural starting point at collective stage 1. The collective stage in
a given situation depends on the individual stages of the persons involved, as well as the general
context. The collective stage will never be higher than any of the individual stages represented
in the group. Fluctuations, both upwards and downwards, can be observed much more frequently
than in individual development, where regress is rather uncommon. As long as a group operates
in a relatively stable environment and has a clearly deﬁned task, an optimal collective stage can
be deduced. This is in contrast to individual persons, who ultimately are confronted with the
challenge engaging them in the complex global order; in the long term, it can fulﬁll such a task
adequately only by post-conventional means.
Individual stages represent a structural whole, implying a consistent strategy to resolve cogni-
tive problems. Collective stages do not possess such consistency. They are the result of interac-
tions between individuals who are themselves moved by cognitive and affective factors. For that
reason, collective stages refer not purely to cognition, but to behavior in general. Furthermore, it
cannot be assumed that in a given situation, all persons involved dispose over the same individ-
ual stage. Therefore, collective stages are always a mixture of different individual stages. This
heterogeneity does not represent a problem per se, as heterogeneity enables the expression of dif-
ferent points of view, which in turn creates the need for discursive interaction and may provoke
individual and collective learning. It is thus clear that collective stages do not represent hierarchi-
cal integrations in the strict sense of the word. They are too heterogeneous and there is no agent
trying to establish overall consistency within the reasoning of a given group. Groups are more
concerned with the question of how they should act than why they should act in a certain way
(Power et al. 1989a: 138). It was in this context that Kohlberg formulated the collective stages
of moral culture (Power et al. 1989b: 271ff):
Collective stage 1 – authoritarian moral culture
There is actually no description of a moral culture at stage 1 by Kohlberg, and one might rightly
argue that there cannot be any moral culture at stage 1. In fact, at stage 1, the moral culture con-
sists in its total absence. Only his own interests determine the behavior of each person; other
people are not taken into account, or if at all, only as a means for egoistic ends. The relationship
between individuals is based on massive – normally physical – coercion. An authority with an
arbitrary legitimization exercises the coercive power. To secure his authority, solidarity among
individuals is undermined to avoid any kind of moral culture and consequent uprising. For that
reason, the concept of community does not enjoy any kind of appreciation and as soon as the
authority loses power, the whole structure evaporates into anarchy. For obvious reasons, the
notion of democracy has no tangible meaning at stage 1.
Collective stage 2 – moral culture of trading relationships
The moral culture at stage 2 has the characteristics of a market place. Relationships with others
are established to engage them in trade. Needs of others are of concern as long as their satisfac-
tion gives the right to the satisfaction of one’s own needs. Needs are perceived in an isolated
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fashion and in a strict means-ends logic; the fact that each individual is a complex whole and
that it is an end in itself is least appreciated. The sense of community is limited to the experi-
ence that trading within a community is easier as needs tend to be similar. At stage 2, demo-
cratic mechanisms are rudimentary, as individual needs are satisﬁed bilaterally and no collective
decisions are required. Collective needs are scarce or are not perceived as such. Overall, democ-
racy at stage 2 implies that everybody can express his own needs. The satisfaction of these needs
is however not a question of justice but of market power. Overall, there is, if at all, only a very
limited moral culture at stage 2.
Collective stage 3 – moral culture of community
It is only from stage 3 onwards that substantial forms of moral culture can be observed. Commu-
nity is appreciated as a netting of strong interpersonal bonds based on friendliness and mutual
consideration; affective fondness and closeness are important elements. The community allows
for reaching goals and creating common norms, which would be impossible to achieve individu-
ally. At stage 3, democracy implies the right to be heard. Individual and collective needs matter
equally. The majority determines collective needs. The majority is the new authority and is
respected even to the detriment of individual interests.
Collective stage 4 – moral culture of stabilization and identiﬁcation
At stage 4, community is perceived as something that is more than the sum of interpersonal rela-
tionships. Community becomes an end in itself. Interpersonal relationships are formalized to sta-
bilize the formerly affective basis of the community. Identities are not only based on personal
relationships but also on norms, principles and institutions, provided by the community. At stage
4, democracy implies the right to express needs, being heard and being taken into consideration,
so that the majority can represent the common good. The pivotal issue at this stage is thus the
beneﬁt to the community.
Kohlberg does not provide descriptions of post-conventional moral cultures. It did not occur
to him, while doing research in schools, that post-conventional moral cultures most probably
would not be identiﬁable, as children and teenagers rarely reach post-conventional stages individ-
ually. Furthermore, schools as social entities are of communitarian, not societal nature. Schools
lack the complexity typical of modern societies and necessary to stimulate post-conventional
structures. Complexity is not an inherent characteristic of a phenomenon; it depends on the per-
spective of the observer (St€uttgen 1999). From that point of view, the presupposition that socie-
ties are more complex than communities is arbitrary. This presupposition is based on the
assumption that schools as communities are designed in such a way that allows students to train
capabilities within a limited and controlled space, whereas public deliberations on the level of a
society are by nature unlimited and uncontrollable, as anybody can participate. As the intention
here is to provide the full array of political cultures, of which moral culture is an important
element, it is proposed to bridge this gap with the descriptions of the following two post-
conventional moral cultures.
Collective stage 5 – moral culture of the constitutional nation state
The ﬁrst post-conventional moral culture considers that an individual is always a member of a
complex society. Society itself is not a given entity; it is the product of innumerable communica-
tive contributions by all members of society. These contributions have to respect fundamental
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rights. The Rechtsstaat and its institutions – in particular parliaments and courts – facilitate the
application of fundamental rights. Minorities enjoy special attention and some privileges. How-
ever, it is the majority who delineates minorities and decides about their special treatment. This
segregative structure is reﬂected in the distinction between civil and human rights too. Human
rights are applicable to everybody, and civil rights to only the citizens of a speciﬁc polity.
Collective stage 6 – moral culture of universalization
Within the second stage of post-conventional moral culture, the notion of global citizenship
(Weltb€urgerrecht) is universalized. Distinctions between citizens and persons without civil rights
are extinguished. All human beings receive equal treatment on all dimensions. The moral culture
of stage 6 does not allow for the mechanisms of segregation, as awareness prevails that such
instruments pervert moral principles at their core and transform them into ideology. At this stage,
no speciﬁc form of good life is propagated. Instead, a mode that permits the co-existence of
most diverse conceptions of good life is at the forefront. These conceptions of good life are in
constant dialog with each other; it is communication that highlights the differences positively.
(World-) society is as complex as it is fragmentary; fragmentation is reﬂected in the identities of
individual persons too. This is not perceived as a threat, because of the prevailing consciousness
that differences are unavoidable. The moral culture of stage 6 permits resolution of unbridgeable
differences peacefully and living diversity positively.
From the concept of moral culture to political culture
The discussion so far has provided two results: ﬁrst, with the collective stages, we have encoun-
tered a conceptual framework that allows differentiating cultural phenomenon both in a descrip-
tive and normative fashion. As this framework is designed in hierarchically integrated stages,
different cultures can be viewed as products of a learning process. Secondly, with the six collec-
tive stages of moral culture, we have an example for substantive descriptions of a variation of a
cultural phenomenon at hand that can be used as a blueprint for the formulation of collective
stages of political cultures.
Before doing so, the question needs to be addressed how moral and political cultures are
interrelated. For obvious reasons, one has to refrain from a moralization of politics by conﬂat-
ing moral and political culture. In this context, Habermas’ distinction between (ethical) dis-
course and (political) deliberation is of great use. He distinguishes discourse, in which the
involved assess whether a norm is morally just, from deliberation, in which the involved
search for consensus or compromise over issues which involve not only a moral dimension,
but also ethical-political and pragmatic considerations (1998: 207). Inspired by the later distinc-
tion, I propose to conceptualize political culture as the sum of four “sub-cultures”: moral cul-
ture, ethical-political culture, pragmatic culture and culture of balancing interests. The moral
culture has been introduced above. It sets the standards that need to be met to preserve the
sense of justice in a given group. The ethical-political culture informs how a group forms its
identity and how its notion of the good life gets established. This does not imply that it is the
expression of a large-scale version of ego-identity. It merely describes what kind of mecha-
nisms a group uses to guarantee both individual and collective identiﬁcations. The pragmatic
culture informs how a group deals with issues of truth. It indicates how a group perceives the
objective world and how it adapts itself to it. The culture of balancing interests informs how a
group deals with situations in which no consensus can be reached and some sort of compro-
mise is required.
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With these elements, the initial deﬁnition of political culture can be reﬁned: political culture is
the sum of the collectively held but not formally institutionalized norms and believes which steer
political actors in their public views and actions. It guides political actors in their search for con-
sensus or compromise over political issues. Whenever political decisions are taken, the involved
need to consider moral, ethical-political and pragmatic dimensions, as well as how interests can
be balanced. The informal modes of these considerations are inscribed in the political culture.
Although political culture and public reason are concerned to a certain extent with similar issues,
they cannot be equalized. Public reason is a purely normative concept, idealizing the rational
and solidary support for the common good by all members of a state. In a similar vein, we can
distinguish between just deliberations and political culture: just deliberation is a communicative
activity, which requires speciﬁc institutions as well as a speciﬁc political culture; otherwise, a
consensus based on reason and solidarity cannot be expected. Political culture is the sum of col-
lectively held but not formally institutionalized norms and beliefs which may favor the use of
reason and solidarity to a higher or lower degree.
The six stages of political culture
Based on the previous reﬂections, it is now possible to formulate six collective stages of political
culture. As shown in the Table 1, each stage is composed of four “sub-cultures”, which together
form ideal types (Weber 1968: 190) of political culture. What follows is a description of these
six collective stages.
Collective stage 1 – Political culture of fear
The moral culture relevant to the political culture of fear is characterized by its absence. The
moral culture of stage 1 leads to no consideration for others; one’s own interests dominate but
only those of the authority prevail. However, the assertion is based on the means of power
instead of the others’ consent. When a political culture of fear reigns, ethical-political questions
arise, if at all, to a very limited extent. The deﬁnition of who holds the power resolves all other
questions, as all other actors remain in a state of total dependency. Issues of survival dominate
and questions of individual or collective identity play, if at all, a minor role. With a political cul-
ture of fear, pragmatic aspects appear to be totally materialistic and immutable. They seem to be
sole limitations and/ or threats. One can even doubt if, in a political culture of fear, the issues of
truth, and the good and the just can be distinguished, as the authority dominates all areas with
the same undifferentiated means of (physical) power. For that reason, the culture of balancing
interests is equally weak: As the authority always prevails, no compromises need to be searched
for. Summing up, the political culture of fear is the state of minimal differentiation.
Collective stage 2 – Political culture of egoism
The moral culture, relevant to the political culture of egoism, is the one of markets – relation-
ships with others are established to engage in trade. The needs of others play a role insofar as
contributions to their satisfaction engender the right to satisfy one’s own needs. However, satis-
faction of needs itself is not a question of justice; it solely depends on market power. Ethical-
political questions continue to play a minor role. Individual and collective identities seem to be
byproducts of trade relationships. The undifferentiated worldview also appears in the context of
pragmatic aspects. As at stage 1, they seem to be materialistic and immutable, but they are not
only perceived as limitations and/ or threats, but also as opportunities to gain advantage over
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other actors. In that sense, the political culture of egoism is the culture of balancing interests in
its simplest form. However, the principles by which interests are balanced are extremely undif-
ferentiated. In a ﬁgurative sense, any bill must be paid immediately and in the same currency;
otherwise, no transaction will take place.
Collective stage 3 – Political culture of community
The political culture of community is based on the netting of strong interpersonal relationships
which are friendly and respectful. The community allows pursuing goals and creating values,
which are otherwise unachievable. Within the community, a sense of identity can be established.
This identity is founded on family or clan feeling. However, the positive identiﬁcation is limited
to the small circle of persons with whom one maintains close bonds. As the interpersonal rela-
tionships and the communities’ social realities become moldable, pragmatic aspects also change
in nature. Within the community, pragmatic aspects can be manipulated. Due to higher degrees
of differentiation of all relevant aspects, more sophisticated modes of balancing interests become
available. Compromise to the detriment of one’s own interests is always unacceptable at stage 2,
but at stage 3 the same would be acceptable if it is in favor of the community. Renunciations
are however limited to the small circle of the community. Overall, it can be stated that at stage
3, a vague notion of collective goods is emerging.
Collective stage 4 – Political culture of traditions
The moral culture of the political culture of traditions focuses on stabilization and identiﬁcation.
At stage 3, community is still perceived as a by-product of interpersonal relationships. At stage
4, community as such becomes a priority. It is perceived as being bigger than the sum of the
individual relationships between the group members. The interpersonal relationships at stage 3
are still dominated by affective aspects. To stabilize them, they are formalized at stage 4 and
attributed to speciﬁc functions within the community. Accordingly, the ethical-political culture is
transformed. Collective identities are not anymore based on interpersonal relationships. They are
derived from speciﬁc geographic locations and historical events and referred to by symbols and
rituals. Individual identities are derived from the origin of a person. In general, identities seem
to emerge out of themselves and remain changeless. Due to the availability of more abstract cat-
egories, pragmatic aspects lose their totally materialistic characteristics and, therefore, can be col-
lectively redeﬁned. These more abstract categories also allow for new modes of balancing
interests. Instead of balancing interests simultaneously, they may be balanced over a longer per-
iod of time and in different categories. Overall, stage 4 includes the notion of public goods and
expands the timeframe to a longer term.
Collective stage 5 – Political culture of the constitutional nation-state
In comparison to the conventional stages of political culture, the post-conventional stages are
further differentiated. This can be seen in the moral culture of stage 5: the social signiﬁer is no
longer the community, but the society. Society itself is not perceived as a ﬁxed entity, but as the
product of innumerable communicative contributions of all societal members. At conventional
stages, interpersonal relationships prevail, but at post-conventional stages, anonymous and func-
tional relationships become the dominant mode of social interaction. It is crucial that these rela-
tionships are always guided by human rights. The Rechtsstaat and its institutions enable and
facilitate this endeavor. The complexity of societal and state structures is also reﬂected in the
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modes in which identities are formed. First of all, more complex structures permit a bigger vari-
ety of individual identities. Secondly, identities do not rely on materialistic and seemingly
changeless foundations, but on abstract principles and procedures which allow for diversity. A
more abstract reasoning also prevails in the context of pragmatic issues. Mechanical concepts of
reality are replaced by more complex idealizations. In particular, the time horizon is expanded
considerably, and motivates sustainable solutions of pragmatic problems. At stage 5, compro-
mises and renunciations appear in a new light. The culture of balancing interests at stage 5
approves a preferential treatment of minorities. With a more differentiated and long term vision,
the society perceives that the discrimination of minorities is detrimental not only to the discrimi-
nated, but also to the discriminator. Overall, the political culture of the constitutional nation-state
produces, therefore, public goods not only for the long term, but also of a complex nature.
Collective stage 6 – Political culture of cosmopolitanism
The moral culture of the political culture of cosmopolitanism strives for universalization. The
moral culture at stage 6 dissolves differences between members of different societies. Stage 5
still differentiates between civil rights, applicable to only citizens of a speciﬁc polity and human
rights, applicable to all human beings. At stage 6, this differentiation is abandoned. However,
this does not imply that only one way of the good life is propagated. On the contrary, the moral
culture of stage 6 permits an open dialog between different concepts of good life. The concept
of citizenship vanishes and is replaced by the idea of cosmopolitanism. In that new light, identi-
ties change their quality. They no more have a materialistic appearance, as at stage 4; their core
is no more a number of general principles, as at stage 5. At stage 6, the view prevails that both
individual and collective identities are the product of communicative processes. For that reason,
the care of these communicative processes becomes essential. Commonalities – in the shape of
shared communicative processes – and differences – perceivable only by communicating with
each other – remain, therefore, in balance. This does not mean that within the culture of cosmo-
politanism all differences are dissolved. In fact, all aspects of life, in particular identities, are fur-
ther fragmented. However, these fragmentations are not perceived as a threat, as there is the
awareness that differences are unavoidable. The moral culture of universalization allows for
resolving unbridgeable differences peacefully and for enjoying diversity. In total contrast to the
perception at stage 1, where pragmatic aspects are viewed as threats, at stage 6 they are per-
ceived in cycles. Potential menaces are not negated but understood as part of a bigger whole.
Accordingly, there is a relaxed attitude towards renunciations. As far as necessary, they are
accepted naturally and perceived in a wider context, which attributes some meaning to them.
Overall, the political culture of cosmopolitanism is the culture in which complexity is produced
and mitigated communicatively.
Postconventionality
When viewing different stages of political culture, the question arises as to which stages prove
adequate for a deliberative democracy and may contribute to the realization of the good and just
statehood. Habermas deﬁnes political culture as an essential element of a deliberative democracy.
He states that a liberal political culture represents the foundation on which the institutions of lib-
erty are based. It disposes citizens and ofﬁce holders to act rationally and to search for consensus
and solidarity. Without political culture, political actors transform themselves into isolated mo-
nads, using their rights as weapons against each other. It goes without saying that stages 1 to 3
do not correspond with what Habermas has in mind. It is also doubtful that stage 4 can fulﬁll
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the needs of a deliberative democracy. At stage 4, although the purely egocentric perspective has
been replaced by a larger vision, besides the interpersonal relationships being less affective and
formalized by traditions, the overall horizon continues to be restricted to the community, which
is devoid of the complexity that is typical of societies. The gap vanishes once Habermas’
requirements are compared with the post-conventional stages of political culture (collective
stages 5 and 6). With our formulations, a given political culture does not appear anymore as a
diffuse netting of mentalities; instead, it can be differentiated analytically into four elements.
Based on the proposed differentiation, the different forms of political culture can be recon-
structed systematically and brought into a hierarchical sequence. In the light of pre-conventional
and conventional political cultures, the normatively desired post-conventional stages show up not
only as normative idealizations, but as challenging, though reachable end points of individual
and collective cognitive learning processes.
This leads to the question: To which status shall the model of collective stages of political cul-
tures and the requirement for post-conventionality be ennobled? It is easy to perceive that the
pre-conventional and conventional collective stages of political culture and its descriptive formu-
lations can be used as analytical tools to better understand speciﬁc political situations. The same
applies for post-conventional stages, as far as they can be identiﬁed empirically. The requirement
for post-conventionality however is normatively motivated. It shall remain an open question,
whether the trend to post-conventionality is motivated only normatively, or if it actually has
anthropological foundations. It is however clear that the project of modernity and its overarching
endeavor – democracy – remains unthinkable without post-conventional structures. The claim of
universality of the principle of post-conventionality is less oppressive than it might look at ﬁrst
sight: boiled down to its core, it implies that legitimate decisions can be reached only when all
perspectives are taken into account, without favoring one particularly.
Procedures that promote post-conventional political cultures
As only post-conventional stages of political cultures have proven to be adequate for a delibera-
tive democracy and the realization of the good and just statehood, the question arises how such
political cultures can be favored. Habermas’ recommendations prove to be rather vague, which
is why Kohlberg’s methods to promote the development of higher stages of moral consciousness
and moral culture are consulted here. Kohlberg designed these methods for schools. For that rea-
son, they cannot be transferred directly to the political realm. However, Kohlberg’s methods are
useful as they provide six criteria which need to be met by a procedure that is supposed to favor
post-conventional moral cultures. Applying these criteria leads to processes of direct democracy:
According to Habermas, political cultures are produced and regenerated spontaneously (1999:
292), in varied and labyrinthine ways (1990: 95). Political and administrative steering mecha-
nisms of the state fail to inﬂuence the political culture. Even if the state could inﬂuence the
political culture, it should abstain from doing so, as indoctrination and other means of manipula-
tion would erode the foundations of post-conventional political cultures, which are based on free
will. Solidarity and reasonableness can be hoped for, but they can never be enforced. Because of
this, Habermas avers that orientation towards the public good should be extolled in small coins
(1999: 381). From Habermas’ point of view, post-conventional political cultures are the result of
learning processes which take place beyond the institutionalized mechanisms of the formation of
political will. To favor such learning processes, he suggests a jurisdictional structure that
includes the maximum instances of auto-correction. Such structures admit the need for constant
revision of all state acts. Instances of auto-correction can be exempliﬁed by the requirement of
multiple readings of laws in the chambers of parliament or by the normal channel of courts
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(1996: 88). As each instance of auto-correction includes the possibility to deliberate and revise
positions, the political culture can be regenerated simultaneously. From a conceptual point of
view, Habermas’ suggestions make sense. However, the impact of deliberations in parliaments
and courts on the political culture of a whole polity remains questionable, as only few persons
are actively involved in such procedures.
Reverting to Kohlberg to identify adequate procedures for the promotion of post-conventional
political cultures can be justiﬁed by the fact that Kohlberg not only established analytical tools
to describe and understand individual moral consciousness and collective moral cultures, he also
designed pedagogical methods to favor the development to higher stages of moral reasoning and
moral culture. He introduced and tested successfully two methods: dilemma-discussions and the
just community-approach. In dilemma-discussions, students regularly deliberate hypothetical
moral dilemmas. By exposing themselves to the arguments of others, they train themselves in
changing perspectives and acquiring more complex cognitive structures of moral reasoning
(Colby and Kohlberg 1986: 159). However, no impact on the moral behavior could be detected
when applying the method of dilemma-discussions (Steffek 2000:144).
For that reason, Kohlberg designed a model in which students, teachers and administrators
of a school decide, on a regular basis, jointly on issues relevant to their daily school life
(Power et al. 1989c). He could show in various empirical applications that the just commu-
nity-approach produces positive effects on the moral reasoning capabilities, on the moral
behavior of the students as well as on the overall moral culture of the school. However, there
was one important limitation: no post-conventional stages could be achieved (Kohlberg 1980:
28). That is also why Kohlberg formulated only pre-conventional and conventional collective
stages of moral culture. It did not occur to him that just communities lack the complexity typi-
cal of societies, precisely because they are in sociological terms of communitarian and not of
societal nature. Despite the limitation of Kohlberg’s methods, six conceptual criteria can be
derived which have to be met by a procedure that is supposed to produce post-conventional
political cultures:
(1) The procedure must treat real and relevant issues, as dilemma-discussions of hypothetical
issues have shown to have no impact on behavior and culture.
(2) The procedure must allow for active participation of all the persons concerned, not only in
the deliberation but also in the ﬁnal decision. Having the ﬁnal say is an important motiva-
tional factor to get involved in a debate which otherwise remains hypothetical.
(3) The participation in the procedure must be voluntary: An obligation to participate in a pro-
cedure that is supposed to generate post-conventional political cultures would be a contra-
diction in itself, as the core of post-conventionality is the disposition to solidarity and
reasonableness based on free will.
(4) The procedure must treat complex issues: The deliberation of issues relating to communi-
ties must contribute to the development of conventional moral cultures. Owing to the lack
of complexity of communitarian issues, post-conventional stages could not be reached in
schools. The introduction of issues of the organization of modern societies will guarantee
the degree of complexity required to stimulate post-conventional structures. The participa-
tion of all members of a society will further increase the complexity of the resolution of an
issue.
(5) The procedure must be self-reﬂective and self-referential: An important element of post-
conventionality is that it motivates self-reﬂexion and has an open structure devoid of exter-
nal restrictions. To replicate and reinforce these traits, the procedure has to allow it to be
its own object, so that it is possible to decide both on content issues and on formal adapta-
tions of the procedure.
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(6) The procedure must be applied on a regular basis: Empirical cases show that a regular
application of methods such as dilemma-discussions and decision-making and taking pro-
cesses within just communities is crucial to sustainable development of moral culture to
higher stages. For that reason, the procedure that promotes post-conventional political cul-
ture should be allowed to occur with quite some frequency.
Considering these six criteria, the question arises as to which procedure can meet all these cri-
teria, and can at the same time generate legitimate and binding political decisions. In (delibera-
tive) democracies, parliamentarian processes are traditionally the procedure applied to generate
legitimate and binding political decisions. From the point of view relevant to this article, their
limitation lies in the restricted number of persons involved. For that reason, it cannot be assumed
that parliamentarian processes contribute to the generation of post-conventional political culture
of a polity on a large scale. This leads to the question if at least the elections of the representa-
tives serve the cause of post-conventionality. Elections do not fulﬁll the forgoing criteria,
because in elections, candidates are the concern, not issues. From a psychological point of view,
electing a representative implies a regression, as the responsibility to decide is delegated to
another person, who is then followed in pre-conventional or conventional modes. Furthermore,
the frequency of parliamentarian elections is so low that no sustainable effect could be assumed
on the generation of post-conventional political culture.
The search for a procedure that fulﬁlls the six criteria leads to processes of direct democracy.
They represent the mechanism in which citizens have the ﬁnal decision making power and may
overrule the parliament and/ or the government. It is important to note that I speak of processes of
direct democracy, not of direct democracy tout court. In my understanding, processes of direct
democracy do not represent a full-ﬂedged political regime that could function on a stand-alone
basis. They are an institutional complement to a democratic regime with representative parliaments,
independent courts etc.. In that light, concepts such as deliberative or participatory democracy are
to be viewed on a different theoretical level. In theories of deliberative democracy, it is argued that
the exchange of ideas, opinions and values and the reaching of a reasoned consensus before politi-
cal decisions are taken is crucial for the functioning of a democracy; this position can be viewed in
opposition to aggregative theories, in which it is maintained that political interests are ﬁxed and the
only relevant moment is the fair aggregation of votes in elections (Turan 2011). Theories of partici-
patory democracy have again a different focus: they stress the importance of political participation
in general; including non-institutionalized forms of participation (Kaase 2011). As the following
debate shows, processes of direct democracy meet the six criteria established above:
(1) Processes of direct democracy treat real and relevant issues. The outcome of processes of
direct democracy can be binding and has a real impact on the polity. Deﬁning certain legal
requirements for the initiation of processes of direct democracy can ensure the relevance of
the issues.
(2) Processes of direct democracy allow active participation of all persons concerned: They can
be designed in a way that permits citizens to initiate processes of direct democracy and to
take the ﬁnal decision.
(3) The participation in processes of direct democracy can be voluntary.
(4) Processes of direct democracy treat complex issues: The processes regulate political issues
of a polity; they are derived from their societal context. Modern societies, by deﬁnition, are
of complex nature and for that reason, processes of direct democracy can be assumed to
treat complex issues.
(5) Processes of direct democracy are self-reﬂective and self-referential: They can be designed
in such a way that they themselves can become the object of a process of direct
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democracy. This is in particular the case when all constitutional matters, including the
formal regulation of processes of direct democracy, are subject to processes of direct
democracy.
(6) Processes of direct democracy can be applied on a regular basis: Because of their dynamic
nature, modern societies never lack complex issues to be regulated collectively. By design-
ing the legal requirements in such a fashion that insurmountable hurdles do not hinder the
initiation of processes of direct democracy, an adequate number of processes of direct
democracy can be expected.
Processes of direct democracy in theories of deliberative democracy
Processes of direct democracy are a promising candidate for the promotion of post-conven-
tional political culture. As the theoretical foundation of this research is the theory of delibera-
tive democracy, it is interesting to analyze how theorists of deliberative democracy
conceptualize these processes. First, Habermas’ position will be summarized. This will be fol-
lowed by a debate of other critical and favorable positions. This debate will allow for assess-
ing the adequacy of the processes of direct democracy within the theories of deliberative
democracy.
Habermas’ theoretical contributions to processes of direct democracy are rather limited. This
is somewhat surprising, considering what he states with the principle of discourse: Only such
norms can be assumed to be valid if all people concerned approve (or could have approved)
them in a practical discourse (1983: 103). In a similar vein, he states that laws can be assumed
to be legitimate only if they ﬁnd approval by all citizens in a discursive process regulated by
law (2005: 100). However, he does not derive from these principles a request for processes of
direct democracy. This is because, in his view, there is no possibility to include large numbers
of citizens in deliberations. That is why he bets on parliamentarian processes, in which delibera-
tions can take place more easily (1998: 210). The political institutions in the center depend,
however, on impulses coming from the periphery, although it is the institutionalized procedure
that generates legitimacy and not the citizens themselves. Their contributions are to be extolled
in small coins; citizens shall contribute to the formation of the political will without participating
in the ﬁnal decision. Habermas recognizes that this concept easily leads to a populist relationship
between citizens and ofﬁce holders that deliberations end up being dominated by (charismatic)
persons and that party programs tend to be commoditized. Habermas believes that such an ill
could be cured only by communicative practices of auto-determination, but he pursues this idea
only very feebly. In his comments on speciﬁc political issues, Habermas draws more frequently
on processes of direct democracy. He advocated for a referendum on the re-uniﬁcation of Ger-
many, particularly because this would have laid the foundation for a new (post-conventional)
political culture (1990: 165). For similar reasons, he advocated a referendum on the European
constitution after the failure of the Lisbon treaty (2008a: 10). In an interview, he expressed his
admiration for the republican mode of democracy practiced by Swiss citizens, though he ques-
tioned, in view of continental and global challenges, if the Swiss processes of direct democracy
dispose over an adequate grasp (2008b: 49). Overall, Habermas considers that processes of direct
democracy play only a marginal role, although he does not exclude them by deﬁnition and is
actually aware of their ability to contribute positively to the formation of (post-conventional)
political cultures.
There are only a few theorists of deliberative democracy who are in total opposition to pro-
cesses of direct democracy. Wolfensberger dismisses such mechanisms per se; he argues that the
American people are not interested in more participation on the federal level and that the state
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referendums and initiatives have turned into weapons of special-interests instead of remaining
safety valves for the last resort (2000: 4, 279). It is true that certain American states face alarm-
ing situations and some of their problems are also related to perverse effects of initiatives and
referendums. It would be however methodologically unsound to dismiss processes of direct
democracy when looking only at negative cases. Sabato, Ernst and Larson question processes of
direct democracy in light of big budgets in campaigns in the USA (2001; Matthews 2005). The
amount of money spent on campaigns has undoubtedly increased – the same is true for electoral
campaigns. Money from lobbies challenges democratic institutions in general and new modes of
ﬁnancing and transparency are required. Processes of direct democracy may prove useful in
establishing new rules and disseminating them in the general population. Petit argues against the
processes of direct democracy, because they may induce passionate feelings that hinder delibera-
tions (2006: 95ff). At the same time, he appreciates the positive contribution to more legitimate
decisions and expects that these procedures have a favorable impact on the performance of the
parliament (2003: 153 ff). Leduc lists a dozen factors, which may reduce the deliberative quality
of the processes of direct democracy; they concern mainly the possibility of manipulation by the
government, with overwhelming budgets for campaigns, with misleading wording of the ballot,
low levels of information, as well as the problem of low turnout, the potential for polarization
etc. (2006: 7ff). While Leduc’s considerations cannot be dismissed lightly, it has to be admitted
that they apply equally to the processes of representative democracy. In addition to that, it
should be considered that the potential problems also depend also to a high degree on the
speciﬁc regulation of processes of direct democracy, as a comparison for example between the
Californian and the Swiss legislation would show (M€ockli 1994).
Theorists of deliberative democracy who favor the processes of direct democracy agree that
the act of voting itself cannot replace the deliberative process. The main argument for pro-
cesses of direct democracy lies in the fact that these procedures help to impart between the
political center with its institutions and ofﬁce holders on the one hand and the periphery and
the citizens on the other hand. In Mastronardi’s view, processes of direct democracy work as
ﬁlters between the center and the periphery and empower the citizens considerably as they can
represent themselves on certain issues without any intermediary (2007: 174, 258). In opposition
to Scheyli (2000: 184), Mastronardi argues that the processes of direct democracy do not inte-
grate the periphery into the political center, because decisions taken in such procedures remain
the exception. Schneider demonstrates in a comparative study that the processes of direct
democracy are able to reﬂect the complexity of the issue in question, as long as there is a ver-
satile media system and an active citizenry. She even concludes that the quality of public
debates proved to be better in the regime with processes of direct democracy as in the purely
representative system (2003: 222ff). Admittedly, such positive effects depend on a number of
factors such as a certain educational level, as well as a certain level of social and economic
security. Once institutions of the processes of direct democracy and of the preconditions are in
place, a mutually reinforcing mechanism is activated, improving the way these procedures are
applied, the educational and socio-economical context, and the political culture of the polity
(Mastronardi 2007: 272).
This brief overview demonstrates that the processes of direct democracy may occupy a more
prominent role among the theories of deliberative democracy. It also shows how several
authors presume that these processes contribute to the production of (post-conventional)
political culture, but none of them constructed a complete argument in that direction. With
regard to political culture, it can be said that these processes are not only a complement to
other deliberative institutions, but are essential for the generation of post-conventional political
cultures.
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Processes of direct democracy and their impact on political culture
Thus far, processes of direct democracy have not been differentiated. In this section, applying
the criterion of the degree of liberty in participating in the political decision, four types of pro-
cesses of direct democracy are distinguished (listed with increasing degree of participation; for a
detailed discussion on available classiﬁcations refer to Svensson 2011):
• Processes of direct democracy which have to be applied by law: Neither ofﬁce holders nor
citizens have an inﬂuence on the triggering of such processes;
• Processes of direct democracy, which can be initiated by the parliament and/ or the govern-
ment: Citizens have no direct inﬂuence on triggering and formulation of such processes. In
certain cases, public pressure may have some impact on the ofﬁce holders to initiate and/ or
formulate a process of direct democracy;
• Processes of direct democracy in which citizens can veto decisions of the parliament and/ or
the government: Citizens can decide on which issues they want to vote, without having the
power to make their own proposals;
• Processes of direct democracy in which citizens can deﬁne the issues themselves: This gives
citizens the highest degree of participation, because they themselves can propose the issue on
which to vote.
In the following section, these four processes will be assessed in terms of their aptness to gen-
erate post-conventional political cultures. They are listed with increasing aptness:
• Processes of direct democracy, which can be initiated by the parliament and/ or the govern-
ment, are the weakest in terms of generating post-conventional political cultures. As the initia-
tion of such processes depends totally on the goodwill of the parliament and/ or the
government, there is considerable risk of their being applied only to those cases in which the
ofﬁce holders expect results favorable to them. This reduces the citizens to mere means to
blindly legitimize the decisions already taken by the parliament and/ or the government. The
contribution to the generation of post-conventional political culture is further reduced if the
results of such processes of direct democracy are not binding.
• At the ﬁrst glance, the processes of direct democracy, which have to be applied by law, do
not seem to be capable of contributing considerably to the generation of post-conventional
political culture. Paradoxically, this is not the case. The obligation to let the citizens decide
on certain (important) issues demonstrates the conﬁdence that the constitution places in them.
Such an obligation shows that, regardless of the intention of the parliament, the government
and/ or the citizens, the ﬁnal say remains with the citizens. This regulation is of post-conven-
tional nature, as it expresses the position that certain decisions cannot be delegated to any-
body else and that each individual should be able, or become able, to decide on his own. The
reﬂexivity of such procedures becomes particularly clear when the institution of processes of
direct democracy is the object of a process of direct democracy. In these cases, what needs to
be decided is not an issue of policy-content, but the formal design of processes of direct
democracy. To avoid a contradiction in itself, such meta-processes should be, by law, the
object of processes of direct democracy.
• Processes of direct democracy, in which citizens can veto the decisions of the parliament and/ or
the government, can generate even more post-conventional political cultures, because here, the
citizens can actively decide when to intervene and when to veto decisions of the ofﬁce holders.
The more the decisions of the parliament/ and or the government are subject to a potential popu-
lar veto, the more the equality between citizens and ofﬁce holders is afﬁrmed. The fact that citi-
zens can veto a decision taken by ofﬁce holders forces the latter to constantly consider public
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opinion to avoid a possible veto. That is why processes of direct democracy that allow citizens
to veto the decisions of ofﬁce holders are particularly able to generate post-conventional political
cultures. Such procedures demonstrate to the citizens that their representatives are not leaders to
be followed in pre-conventional or conventional modes. They imply full responsibility of the cit-
izens for their political destiny and motivate them to reach post-conventional stages. For obvious
reasons, the impact of generating post-conventional political cultures is reduced if the results of
such processes of direct democracy are non-binding.
• Processes of direct democracy, in which citizens can deﬁne the issues by themselves, are the
strongest for generating post-conventional political cultures. This type permits citizens not
only to trigger a process of direct democracy, but also to deﬁne the issue to be voted on. Citi-
zens become active on speciﬁc issues and can be sure to have the ﬁnal say on them. With this
instrument at hand, citizens are motivated to reﬂect on the societal realities in general and
shortlist those issues that seem most relevant to them in the processes of direct democracy.
This kind of political involvement is particularly favorable to the generation of post-conven-
tional political culture on a large (societal) scale.
The fact that some types contribute less to the generation of post-conventional political cul-
tures does not imply that they should be excluded from the constitutional menu. On the contrary,
each process has its merits; different types of processes of direct democracy address different
types of issues. Ultimately, it shall be the citizens of an individual polity who have to adapt the
institutions of direct democracy to their speciﬁc needs, again by using the processes of direct
democracy.
Conclusion
Reactivating the dialog between Habermas and Kohlberg has allowed formulating six collective
stages of political culture. With this, the full array of political cultures is available: from the
political culture of fear, typical for authoritarian regimes, to the political culture of cosmopolitan-
ism, the normative vision for a fully democratized global order. The different political cultures
are conceptualized as stages of an individual and collective learning process.
Revisiting Kohlberg’s pedagogical methods to promote the individual cognitive capabilities in
moral reasoning and the moral culture of a collective has shed new light on processes of direct
democracy. It has become clear that these institutions favor the generation of post-conventional
political cultures by involving all citizens into the decision-making process. Processes of direct
democracy represent a unique learning opportunity for the citizen, who, by deciding on speciﬁc
issues, has to assume another responsibility as when he elects a representative. It is not argued
that processes of direct democracy could replace parliamentary decision-making processes; they
are viewed as complements that elevate the citizen to a position in which he can or must make
up his mind on particularly important issues. Ultimately, our argument narrows the difference
between deliberative and liberal theories of democracy. We agree that deliberation is crucial for
the generation of reasonable or at least fair decisions; at the same time we maintain that taking
part in the ﬁnal decision is an important motivational factor for the success of the desired learn-
ing process.
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